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Making Something Out of Nothing:
The Law of Takings and Phillips v.
Washington Legal Foundation
Michael A. Heller & James E. Kriert
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation held that interest
on principal amounts deposited into IOLTA accounts is the
property of the various clients who handed over the money
but expressed no view as to whether the Texas IOLTA pro-
gram worked a taking, or, if it did, whether any compensa-
tion was due. The debates among the justices about the
meaning of private property, argued in terms of contextual
and conceptual severance, are unlikely to prove fruitful. We
elaborate a better approach in terms of the underlying pur-
poses of just compensation. We conclude that efficiency and
justice are best served by uncoupling matters and methods
of deterrence from matters and methods of distribution.
INTRODUCTION
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,' recently decided by a
divided Supreme Court, involved the meaning of the words "private
property" in the Constitution's injunction, "nor shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation."'2 Against
the urgings of several dissenting opinions, the majority approached
and settled the property issue in a way that left the application of
t Assistant Professor and Earl Warren DeLano Professor, University of Michigan
Law School.
'118 S Ct 1925 (1998).
2 US Const, Amend V (ratified 1791). The Fifth Amendment is made applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, B & Q R Co v Chicago,
166 US 226, 239 (1897).
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the rest of the Takings Clause to be resolved on remand. The case
has provoked us to think anew about takings law, and to consider,
in that light, how the issues remaining in Phillips should be resolved.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF PHILLIPS
For generations, law professors and their students have pondered the
question, "What is private property"? The same issue is obviously
latent in every takings dispute, but seldom aired in any because the
"property-ness" of the asset at stake in the litigation is usually
uncontested. In Phillips, it was not.
Behind the case are the trust accounts that lawyers maintain for
client funds.3 A lawyer who holds funds for any one client in an
amount sufficient to earn interest net of banking, accounting, and
tax reporting expenses usually puts the money in a separate interest-
bearing account on the client's behalf. Often, though, client funds
are too nominal in amount, or held for too short a time, to earn net
interest. Prior to 1980, lawyers usually pooled funds of this sort
in federally insured checking accounts which, thanks to banking
regulations, could not pay any interest. (In other words, the float on
the accounts went to the banks.) In 1980, Congress changed the rules
and allowed federally insured banks to offer individuals and cer-
tain charitable organizations a form of interest-bearing checking
account.4 The Federal Reserve Board then ruled that corporate and
partnership funds could be deposited in trust into such accounts if
charitable organizations received the interest.' Finally, the Internal
Revenue Service took the position that interest on lawyer trust
accounts need not be treated as taxable client income if clients could
not participate in selecting the charitable organizations that were
to receive the interest.6
3Our brief summary of the facts underlying Phillips is mostly drawn from the
majority opinion, 118 S Ct at 1928-29.
' See Consumer Checking Account Equity Act of 1980 (Title ll of the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980), Pub L No 96-221 §
303, 94 Stat 146 (1980), codified at 12 USC § 1832(a) (1994), 12 CFR § 204.130 (1997).
' See 118 S Ct at 1928, citing Letter from Federal Reserve Board General Counsel
Michael Bradfield to Donald Middlebrooks (Oct 15, 1981) reprinted in Donald Mid-
dlebrooks, The Interest on Trust Accounts Program: Mechanics of its Operation, 56
Fla BJ 115, 117 (1982). Corporations and partnerships cannot benefit from some features
of pooling because banking regulations prohibit them from using interest-bearing
checking accounts (though if the amounts were sufficient, corporate trust funds would
be held in interest-bearing savings accounts on the client's behalf). See Transcript of
Oral Argument, 1998 WL 13590, at *4 ("Transcript") (noting that about 60% of Texas
IOLTA income came from interest on corporate and partnership deposits).
6 See Rev Rul 81-209, 1981-2 C B 16; Rev Rul 87-2, 1987-1 C B 18.
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Shortly after these changes in the background legal rules, every
state and the District of Columbia began enacting Interest on Law-
yers Trust Account (IOLTA) programs7 to capture the net interest
that could be earned on nominal and short-term client funds.' Four
states now have "voluntary" IOLTA programs in which each lawyer
may decide whether to participate, twenty have programs in which
a lawyer may "opt-out" by advising the state IOLTA agency, and
twenty-seven have "mandatory" programs in which all lawyers must
participate.' Each state program creates a nonprofit umbrella organi-
zation to receive IOLTA funds and distribute them in support of
legal services for the poor. By pooling nominal and short-term client
funds that previously went as interest-free loans to banks, IOLTA
programs are able to generate $100 million a year for legal service
organizations nationwide.
The central question in Phillips-and the only issue that ulti-
mately reached the Supreme Court-had to do with the status of
IOLTA interest earned on funds deposited in Texas' mandatory
IOLTA program. The plaintiffs claimed that, at least for purposes of
the Takings Clause, the interest was the property of the clients who
indisputably owned the underlying principal, but the district court
disagreed.'0 Since the money deposited in IOLTA accounts would
not have earned any interest at all if deposited elsewhere, the clients
really lost nothing. They never had any property in the interest;
hence nothing of theirs was taken." Similar reasoning had probably
persuaded the hundreds of judges around the country who voted to
I The IOLTA concept originated in Australia, spread to Canada, then to the United
States. See Arthur J. England, Jr. & Russell E. Carlisle, History of Interest on Trust
Accounts Program, 56 Fla BJ 101 (1982).
' At oral argument in the Phillips case, lawyers for Texas noted that, "lilt is only
the funds that are incapable, whether using technology, subaccounting, pooling, or
whatever, that can not yield a net benefit to a client, that go into IOLTA." Transcript
at *8-*9 (cited in note 5); see also 118 S Ct at 1932. Some states have incorporated
thresholds into their IOLTA rules such that client funds cannot be considered nominal
or short term if lawyers expect the funds to earn interest of more than $50. ABA/
BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct § 904:4707 (1990). If lawyers guess
wrong and client funds earn more than anticipated, then the funds are expected to
be transferred retroactively out of the IOLTA program and to the client. Id at
§ 901:4602 (1987).
9Id at § 45:202-05 (1997).
10 Washington Legal Foundation v Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation, 873
F Supp 1 (WD Tex 1995).
" Id at 7. The court's logic led it to reject as well a related claim that the Texas
IOLTA program deprived clients of First Amendment rights of freedom of speech
and association by forcing them "to financially support, and thereby associate with,
various recipient organizations whose purported objectives [they] find objectionable."
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adopt IOLTA programs in their states, 2 just as it figured in two
earlier cases decided by federal courts of appeals. 3
But the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit thought otherwise. 4
Obviously, the funds deposited into IOLTA accounts belonged to
the clients, and this meant that the clients owned the amounts
earned by the funds as well, because under the applicable Texas law
"interest follows principal."'" The Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice Rehnquist, affirmed the proposition that IOLTA interest is
the clients' property, but left open the questions whether that prop-
erty had been taken, and, if it had, whether just compensation had
to be paid. 6 Those were matters to be decided on remand.' Four
justices dissented in two separate opinions."
II. THE OPINIONS IN PHILLIPS
So, what is property? Law teachers particularly like the question
because they know, and want their students to see, that it cannot
be answered by a priori reasoning. True, Blackstone referred to prop-
erty as "that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of
the right of any other individual in the universe,"' 9 and this does
seem to say something, but only at first. The statement leaves open
Id at 9. The court ruled as it did in part because "at least as far as the client is
concerned, such a claim is necessarily predicated upon the Plaintiffs' claim that the
funds generated from the IOLTA accounts are, in fact, the property of the client."
Id at 9.
12 The highest courts of seven states have held that IOLTA programs do not work
a taking. Another thirty-seven state supreme courts including Texas used their rule-
making authority to adopt IOLTA programs, while five states adopted the programs
by legislation. See Brief of Amici Curiae Alabama Law Foundation, Inc. et al. in
Support of Petitioners, Phillips, 118 S Ct 1925 (No. 96-1578) available in 1997 WL
476500, at * 12- * 13. See also ABA Comm on Ethics and Prof Responsibility, Formal
Opinion 348 (July 23, 1982) (endorsing ethical propriety of IOLTA programs).
" Washington Legal Foundation v Massachusetts Bar Foundation, 993 F2d 962
(lst Cir 1993) (upholding program against a challenge by the same public interest
law foundation that brought Phillips); Cone v State Bar of Fla, 819 F2d 1002 (1 1th
Cir), cert. denied, 487 US 917 (1987) (upholding IOLTA program in a case where client
trust earned 61z per month, an amount insufficient to earn net interest for the client).
14 Washington Legal Foundation v Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation, 94
F3d 996 (5th Cir 1996).
15 Id at 1004.
16 Phillips, 118 S Ct at 1934.
17 Id.
"1 See id (Souter, J, dissenting, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer)
and id at 1937 (Breyer, J, dissenting, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg).
19 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *2.
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the questions of just when that dominion is recognized, and just
how extensive it is. Blackstone himself acknowledged and discussed
many limitations on property ownership and understood that prop-
erty had come to be a creature of the system. Bentham, writing not
all that much later, made the last point explicit by defining property
as "a basis of expectation; the expectation of deriving certain advan-
tages from a thing," and that expectation "can only be the work of
law. '20 Property "is not material, it is metaphysical; it is a mere
conception of the mind,"'" what others have called "a euphonious
collocation of letters which serves as a general term for the miscel-
lany of equities that persons hold in the commonwealth. 22
From this little discussion, we can see plainly the problem facing
the Court in Phillips, or facing any authoritative lawmaker con-
fronted by the question, "What is private property?": If the Court
were to say that the interest in IOLTA accounts is private property,
then private property it would be; otherwise not. The resulting circu-
larity can be avoided, so far as we can see, by at least two methods.
As it happens, Chief Justice Rehnquist (for the majority) adopted the
first, and Justice Souter (dissenting) the second. So let us examine
each method in turn.
A. Method One: "Private Property" in Isolation
The method here is to confront the what-is-private-property question
in isolation from the other operative words of the Takings Clause
and then pass the buck to somebody else, because, as we have seen,
the question cannot readily be resolved without respect to context.
The majority opinion had grounds for following this segmented
approach. First, the Takings Clause contains the crucial words "pri-
vate property" and "taken" and "just compensation," and it seems
straightforward enough to consider what each of these terms means
in its turn, without regard to the other terms.Y Second, as to the
meaning of private property, the Constitution is thought to protect
property rights that are themselves determined by reference to
'2 1 Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation 137 (1840).
21 Id.
I Walton Hamilton & Irene Till, Property, in 12 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences
528 (1934).
11 The clause mentions "public use" too, but this requirement was not an issue
in Phillips and is pretty much a throw-away in any event, at least in the federal
courts. See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 1112-16, 1214-15 (Aspen,
4th ed 1998) (discussing "public use"). Oddly, the remaining words of the Takings
Clause, "nor" "shall" "be" "for" and "without," seem to have attracted little if any
analytical attention.
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"existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law."24 This view left the Court free to pass the
buck to Texas, relying-as had the court of appeals-on the Texas
rule that "interest follows principal."2 Texas, of course, had done
the same thing much earlier on, looking to English common law to
find the maxim about interest. And the English judges themselves
had never really thought the matter through either; they simply
figured that interest follows principal "as the shadow [does] the
body."26 But this was enough for the majority in Phillips, which
quickly moved from affirming the Texas rule to dismissing several
other assertions on the property issue that had been urged upon the
Court.27
B. Method Two: "Private Property" in Context
As we noted earlier, the Court's decision in Phillips did not dispose
of the case, but only of the private property issue. As a result of the
majority's method, there remained the questions whether private
property had been "taken" and whether and what "just compensa-
tion" might be due. These the Court remanded as distinct inquiries,
separate from the one about "private property."
The dissenters, in contrast, thought that all three questions should
be decided, sensibly could only be decided, as integral parts of a
single inquiry that focused not on the meaning of property in isola-
tion, but rather "only in connection with what is a compensable
' Board of Regents of State Colleges v Roth, 408 US 564, 577 (1972), quoted in
Phillips, 118 S Ct at 1930.
1 The Court held that examples in Texas law where interest does not follow
principal were "insufficient to dispel the presumption of deference given the views
of a federal court as to the law of a State within its jurisdiction." Phillips, 118 S Ct
at 1931. That "two of the three judges" on the court of appeals panel were Texans,
id, seems to have outweighed the inclinations of the Texas Supreme Court (petitioners
Phillips and the "et al" in the case title include the Court's justices) on this aspect
of Texas law.
' Beckford v Tobin, 27 Eng Reg 1049, 1051 (Ch 1749), quoted in Phillips, 118 S
Ct at 1930. In criticizing this reasoning, Justice Breyer wrote, "The slogan interest
follows principal no more answers that question than does King Diarmed's legendary
slogan, To every cow her calf." Id at 1938 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
27 The Court observed that "property is more than economic value," so even if
the value of the interest at stake were equal to zero, the property right in that interest
might still be deserving of constitutional protection, though how it would be protected
is unclear. Id at 1933. Finally, the Court countered arguments that the government
created the value by noting that it is the lawyers who pooled the funds. Id at 1933.
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taking,"2 as Justice Souter put it. By addressing the property issue
on its own, he argued, the Court had ignored "the most salient
fact" in the case, that the client asserting a taking could never have
received net interest, thanks to the combination of federal and state
regulatory provisions that we described earlier.2 9 Those provisions
obviously related to the takings and just compensation issues, but
they were "relevant to the property issue as well, simply because
the way we may ultimately resolve the taking and compensation
issues bears on the way we ought to resolve the property issue."3
It could turn out that the regulatory structure did not effect a taking,
or that the just compensation for any taking was zero. In that event,
"recognizing a client's property right in the interest ... would be
an inconsequential abstraction. ' 3' Accordingly, the best method is
"to consider what is property only in connection with what is a
compensable taking. '32 Since the court of appeals had done other-
wise, the case should have been sent back to it for application of
the correct approach.33
C. Does Method Matter?
One of the interpretive moves dividing the majority and dissenters
in Phillips can be called "contextual severance," a phrase we coin
in order to echo the familiar problem of "conceptual severance" in
takings law.3 4 The majority adopted exactly the method the dissent-
ers opposed, a clause-chopping strategy for reading the Takings
28 Id at 1935 (Souter, J., dissenting).
29 Id at 1934. See text accompanying notes 4-6 (describing the relevant regulations).
30 Id at 1935.
31 Id, citing and quoting Hooker v Burr, 194 US 415, 419 (1904) ("If a contractual
obligation is impaired, but the obligor is 'not injured to the extent of a penny thereby,
his abstract rights are unimportant' ').
32 Id at 1935.
31 Id at 1937. In the other dissenting opinion in Phillips, Justice Breyer expressed
agreement with Justice Souter's views but went on to say that, if one accepted the
"property in isolation" method for the sake of argument, then the majority had its
substantive conclusions wrong. Id at 1938-39 (Breyer, J, dissenting). Justice Souter
agreed.
" Conceptual severance refers to the problem of identifying the relevant property
for constitutional analysis, in this case whether the IOLTA interest is a discrete piece
of property that was wholly taken, or a part of a larger principal that was reasonably
regulated. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Cur-
rents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 Colum L Rev 1667, 1676 (1988) (defining
conceptual severance). See also Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Colum L Rev
1600, 1601 (1988) (noting that conceptual severance might also be called "entitlement
chopping").
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Clause that severs each operative term from all the others in search-
ing for the meaning of constitutional language. But the ultimate
result in Phillips is unlikely to turn on the majority's interpretive
triumph. After all, nothing in the majority's approach-each issue
of itself, seriatim-dictates that a taking will be found, or, if one is,
that compensation will be awarded, just as nothing in the views of
the dissenters-the issues integrated, everything of a piece-
necessarily forecloses such results. Notice also that one cannot even
say which approach generally economizes on the time and expense
of litigation. The majority's seriatim approach ends up doing so
whenever a court finds there is no private property interest, because
in that event the court can avoid other issues (is there a taking?
what is just compensation?). On the other hand, Justice Souter's
integrated method saves time if, but only if, it turns out that every
issue has to be confronted.3"
The justices did more than debate the merits of contextual sever-
ance; they also rehearsed the conceptual severance issue bound to
arise on remand. The majority severed the IOLTA interest from its
principal. "As to principal," the Chief Justice wrote in his opinion
for the Court, "the IOLTA rules at most "regulate[] the use of [the]
property, ' 36 presumably to an insufficient degree to give rise to a
taking. The interest, on the other hand, was a separate thing-indeed,
a real thing that "follows principal" the way a duckling follows
its mother duck-to be regarded as discrete "private property" for
purposes of takings analysis. Never mind that the interest had no
value. "We have never held that a physical item is not 'property'
simply because it lacks a positive economic or market value."3
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter adamantly rejected con-
ceptual severance. "With its narrow focus on a party's right to any
interest generated by its principal, the Court's opinion might be read
(albeit erroneously, in my view) to mean that the accrued interest
is the only property right relevant to the question whether IOLTA
"s Justice Souter was concerned to "avoid spending time on what might turn out
to be an entirely theoretical matter." Phillips, 118 S Ct at 1935. But he overlooked
the fact that the seriatim approach actually saves time in any instance where it leads
to a conclusion that no "private property" interest is at stake, just the result Justice
Breyer would have reached.
36 Id at 1930, quoting Yee v Escondido, 503 US 519, 522 (1992).
11 Id at 1933. The Court's usage is confusing because zero interest is not, by any
stretch of the imagination, "a physical item." The confusion is compounded by what
the Court went on to say: "While the interest income at issue here may have no
economically realizable value to its owner, possession, control, and disposition are
nonetheless valuable rights that inhere in the property." Id at 1933. How does one
possess, control, and dispose of nothing?
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effects a taking.""8 Rather, he said, the takings analysis should con-
sider the principal and interest as a whole. Justice Breyer (also dis-
senting) agreed, but considered, for the sake of argument, whether
the severed interest is private property. He concluded that it is not.
Even if a separate and discrete real thing, IOLTA interest is not the
property of the owner of the principal under his reading of the
selected truisms, Supreme Court precedents, and Texas law 9.3
In short, the members of the Court argued about three different
conceptions: sever IOLTA interest and call it property (the majority);
forbear from severing the interest from its principal (Souter); sever
the interest and still it is not property (Breyer). We prefer a different
approach, one concerned far less with the meaning of "private prop-
erty" and far more with the ethical and economic concerns underly-
ing the Takings Clause.
III. AN EXPANDED APPROACH TO THE LAW
OF TAKINGS
To begin, notice that there is one interesting matter on which all
the justices in Phillips agreed. Recall that the majority concluded
that IOLTA interest is client property but did not decide whether
that property had been taken, or whether, even if it had, any compen-
sation was due. The dissenters, for their part, considered that the
majority's resolution of the property issue was little more than an
academic exercise, because even if the interest had been taken, just
compensation would most likely amount to zero. 4° So the majority
and dissenters actually shared the view that there can be a taking
without compensation, their consensus in this respect probably
owing to the strange combination of circumstances behind IOLTA
programs. The measure of just compensation in takings case is usu-
ally figured with reference to what the aggrieved claimants have
lost.4' Arguably that was nothing because the interest generated
"' Id at 1935 n.3 (Souter, J, dissenting).
31 Id at 1938-39 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
4o See Part II above (describing the views of the majority and the dissenters). The
majority's precise words were: "We express no view as to whether these funds have
been 'taken' by the State; nor do we express an opinion as to the amount of 'just
compensation,' if any, due respondents." Phillips, 118 S Ct at 1934. Justice Souter
said much the same for the dissenters: it could "turn out that ... the IOLTA scheme
had not taken the property recognized today, or... that the 'just compensation' for
any taking was zero." Id at 1935.
41 See, for example, id at 1936 (Souter, J, dissenting) (noting compensation measured
by claimant's loss, not by government's or public's gain).
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by IOLTA programs would not have been earned by the aggrieved
claimants in any event.
In that sense, the idea of a taking without compensation is utterly
conventional. But in another sense it is not. Phillips provoked us to
think more generally about the virtues of uncoupling "taking" on the
one hand from "compensation" on the other. The exercise resulted in
an expanded conception of takings law that we have explained at
some length elsewhere.42 Here we shall sketch the approach in just
enough detail to permit some thoughts about its bearing on Phillips.
We begin with the purposes underlying the Takings Clause, which
everyone seems to agree are efficiency on the one hand and justice
on the other.4 1 We find it useful to think about these two objectives
in terms of deterrence and distribution, respectively. The obligation
to pay compensation for the taking of property aims to promote
efficiency by deterring governmental agencies from undertaking reg-
ulatory moves that are not worth their social cost. The obligation
to pay brings the price system into play and thus helps shape appro-
priate incentives. The larger the burden imposed on property owners
by some regulatory program, the greater the case for government
liability with respect to those burdens, in order to promote what
we call general deterrence. Specific deterrence has the related but
somewhat different objective of using the obligation to pay as a
means of thwarting government efforts to promote the public good
at the expense of politically vulnerable groups and individuals."
Turn now from efficiency and deterrence to distributional justice,
the second concern of the Takings Clause. The idea here is to spread
the costs of regulatory programs widely rather than having them fall
unfairly on a relatively few owners of property. As Justice Black put
it in a well-known statement: "The Fifth Amendment's guarantee
42 See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the
Law of Takings, 112 Harv L Rev 997 (1999) ("Heller & Krier, Deterrence"). Our
development and application of uncoupling in the takings context is entirely novel,
but the general idea of separating two things ordinarily tied together has appeared
before in the case law and in the literature. See, for example, BMW of North America
v Gore, 517 US 559, 614-18 (1996) (Ginsburg, J, dissenting) (Appendix to Opinion)
(noting the thirteen states that require payment of a portion of punitive damage
awards to state agencies rather than to plaintiffs); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Detrebling
versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the Theory of Enforcement, 74
Geo LJ 1231 (1986) (discussing idea of uncoupling amount of antitrust damages paid
by defendant from amount of damages paid to plaintiff).
4 The classic discussion is Frank 1. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv L Rev
1165 (1967).
4 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 Int'l
Rev L & Econ 125 (1992).
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that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just
compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole."4
Regarding distribution, it proves useful once again to contrast the
specific to the general. Specific distribution is a term we coin to
describe the conventional method of compensation that courts use
in takings cases now. Losses are determined and distributed on an
individual basis; each property owner receives a payment specifically
tailored to compensate for the reduction in value of his or her prop-
erty. General distribution, something of our own invention, would
work very differently. The government would be required to pay,
but the amount due would be calculated by aggregating average
individual losses. The resulting total would not be handed over to
individual owners but instead deposited into a special fund, into
general revenues, or even rebated to taxpayers. (We shall discuss
fruitful variations on this approach later in connection with Phillips.)
For general distributions to work effectively the relevant intergov-
ernmental fiscal boundaries must not be too porous, else damage
payments could flow back to the responsible government bureau
and undermine the intended deterrent effect. 46 Legislative bodies
would have to resist any temptation simply to make an agency whole
again in the next round of the budgetary process. Given that agencies
compete for funds, they should be eager to police the appropriation
process in this regard.
To illustrate the virtues of general distribution, consider the not
unusual case where a government regulatory program imposes small
costs on a very large number of property owners. Because the costs
may be large in the aggregate, general deterrence becomes a concern.
At the same time, however, the large number of aggrieved owners
means that the transaction costs of figuring out and compensating
for losses on an individual basis by way of a specific distribution are
likely to be high enough to swamp whatever net social benefits
might otherwise flow from the government program in question.
Here the conventional law forces us to a difficult choice: If we say
there is no taking, then the government pays nothing when deter-
rence might call for it to pay something. And if we say there is a
taking, then potentially beneficial programs might be abandoned, or
45 Armstrong v United States, 364 US 40, 49 (1960).
'6 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 64 (Aspen, 5th ed 1998)
(noting how hard budget constraints can discipline public officials). Another approach
could be to require that a general distribution take the form of a tax refund or cut.
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pursued at a net loss, because the high transaction costs of making
conventional specific distributions will wipe out any social gains.
By inventing the mechanism of general distribution, we make the
difficult choice unnecessary. We can for the sake of deterrence charge
the responsible government agency, yet at the same time reduce
transaction costs dramatically by figuring compensation only on an
average basis, and distributing it generally rather than specifically.
So long as justice does not call for individual payments, the method
can resolve the tensions inherent in the conventional approach to
takings.
The short of it is this. Conventional takings law couples together
matters that should be treated independently. Cases are resolved by
holding either that there is a taking and compensation is due or that
there is no taking and no compensation is due. This is fine enough
when one or the other result harmoniously serves the dual purposes
of the Takings Clause-efficiency and justice or, in our terms, deter-
rence and distribution. Commonly, however, the two purposes come
into conflict. To deal with such situations, we need two more possi-
ble case resolutions. One would allow the courts to find a taking,
for the sake of deterrence, but not require compensation (in the form
of a specific distribution).4 The other would allow the courts to find
no taking but award compensation anyway, as a matter of fairness.
Note that, in the last class of cases, the required funds could come
from the money banked in cases of taking/no specific distribution
or from other revenues. Legislation might be required in order to
give the judiciary a disbursing power.
In our view, the expanded set of four that results from the foregoing
exercise helps illuminate and resolve many of the standard problems
in takings law.48 Here we focus on problems in Phillips.
IV. PHILLIPS ON REMAND
The IOLTA program considered in Phillips is an example of govern-
ment regulatory activities that impose small burdens on a large
number of people, meaning that large sums are involved in the aggre-
gate. We would usually think about cases of this sort in the following
way: Since the programs in question impose only small per capita
costs, there is little reason to require specific distributions, whether
41 In these taking/no specific distribution cases, the constitutional requirement
of "just compensation" may be met, in our view, through the use of a general distribu-
tion. See Heller & Krier, Deterrence at 1007 (cited in note 42) (elaborating on this
point).
41 See id at 1005-13 for discussion.
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for reasons of fairness or to ease demoralization costs. On the other
hand, given the large total sums at stake, efficiency concerns might
sometimes call for payment by the government as a general deterrent,
or as a specific deterrent if the circumstances suggest exploitation
of politically vulnerable groups. The high transaction costs of com-
pensating large numbers of people, however, suggest any payment
should take the form of a general distribution.
That is the general picture, but Phillips requires a more particular
analysis, because IOLTA is what we call a "pooling" program, and
a rather unusual one to boot.
A. Pooling in General, and in IOLTA Programs
Programs that create value by pooling are common but their analysis
has been neglected, especially in connection with takings.4 9 Physical
or legal interests with little realizable value in individual ownership
often gain value when pooled to a more useful scale, as where the
government takes small fragments of interest from many clients to
fund legal services that provide statewide public benefits.
1. How Pooling Generates Value.-Pooling programs yield added
value in those circumstances where increasing marginal gains (or
decreasing costs) are realized as an additional person's assets are put
into the pool and used along with the aggregate. In the case of IOLTA,
increasing gains are relatively unimportant. They might be realized
if banks pay higher rates of interest as the size of an account goes
up, but any such effects will be modest because IOLTA funds are
pooled only within each lawyer's office; the total size of any given
account will remain relatively small and the rate of interest will
thus be affected little, if at all.
Decreasing costs are another story. IOLTA programs have a com-
parative advantage in the generation and distribution of interest.
Pooling makes productive those client funds that would not earn
"9 Generally, pooling cases arise when the government attempts to overcome a
tragedy of the commons or of the anticommons by bundling fragments at the bound-
aries of private property. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 Harv L Rev 621 (1998):
In a commons, by definition, multiple owners are each endowed with the [right]
to use a given resource, and no one has the right to exclude another. When
too many owners have such [rights] of use, the resource is prone to overuse-a
tragedy of the commons.... In an anticommons,... multiple owners are each
endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one
has an effective [right] of use. When there are too many owners holding rights
of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse-a tragedy of the anticommons.
Id at 623-24.
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interest on their own, 0 and the manner of distributing these earn-
ings-to a single agency rather than multiple clients-avoids the
costs of keeping individualized records and making individualized
payments. The resulting reduction in accounting expenses for tax
and other purposes turns out to be very substantial.5 '
The Court in Phillips was very much mistaken when it said of
IOLTA programs that "the State does nothing to create value. '5 2 To
see the point, take any situation where it would cost a lawyer more
to distribute client interest (to the client) than the amount of that
interest itself. If instead the lawyer pools all client funds into a single
account and then makes a distribution to a single recipient (and that
is how IOLTA works), the costs of generating and distributing the
interest will usually be far less than the total interest earned. 3 The
Figure below illustrates the marginal effect of adding each new mem-
ber to a pool, and the cumulative totals as the pool grows.
Marginal Effects of Pooling Cumulative Totals from Pooling
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_10 Number of Clients In Pool -40 Number of Clients In Pool
Figure: Marginal and Cumulative Values from Pooling 4
10 See note 8 above (discussing limitation of IOLTA programs to nominal and
short-term client funds).
"' See ABA Task Force and Advisory Board on Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts,
Report to the Board of Governors, 22-24 (July 1982) (detailing cost savings from pooling
in the generation and distribution of interest earned on client funds).
12 Phillips, 118 S Ct at 1933. As an aside, our argument does not require determining
whether the state creates the value by pooling, or whether the value is an artifact of
the background regulatory or technological structure.
-3 Nevertheless, Phillips is odd as a pooling case. States can generate scale efficien-
cies more easily than can individual clients, but IOLTA is not necessarily the best
way of doing this. Just as IOLTA programs shifted $100 million in interest to states,
so the states could have collected the same amount using targeted taxes on banks,
lawyers, or clients, or on other consumers of the public goods that the legal system
provides its users. Depending on the costs of these alternative methods of collecting
and redistributing funds for legal services, IOLTA programs may or may not be the
most efficient approach.
-1 The Figure shows how pooling can generate value, but the underlying numbers
are merely illustrative and not drawn from any specific IOLTA program. As an aside,
the Figure can be easily generalized. Regulatory schemes that exploit scale economies
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2. The Interesting Numbers for Takings Analysis.-The majority
in Phillips fixed its attention on Point A in the Figure, the gross
interest earned by any given client's principal. The dissenters, on
the other hand, thought that if any interest mattered, it was the
negative amount indicated by Point B, negative because there would
be no net interest to distribute in the unpooled case.
In our view, neither of these numbers matter near as much as
two other numbers that all the opinions in Phillips ignored. The
first of these, Point C, is the net amount of interest that clients
could withhold from IOLTA programs if given the option to do so
(by stating, for example, that their funds were not to go into IOLTA
accounts)."5 No doubt it was C that Justice Breyer had in mind when
he asserted that the "most Texas law here could have taken from
the client is ... the client's right to keep the client's principal sterile,
a right to prevent the principal from being put to productive use by
others." 6 The observation is incorrect. A client option to deny C to
an IOLTA program would not render the client's funds sterile; they
would remain productive, but the interest they produced would go to
depository banks. In this sense, IOLTA programs simply redistribute
wealth from banks to organizations that provide legal services for
low-income people.
Point D is another important number. It signifies the total net
interest earned on the funds pooled in IOLTA accounts. The majority
in Phillips deferred consideration of D.s7 Justices Souter and Breyer,
who did consider the value it represented, concluded that the
amounts were attributable to the government (and hence not taken
will usually impose non-zero monetary harm on a number of people; each individual's
burden shifts the marginal cost curve upward but does not affect its shape. The more
each individual is harmed, the larger the pool necessary before cumulative benefits
exceed total costs; at the extreme, per capita harms can be so high that the program
in question will be inefficient no matter how large the pool of contributors becomes.
At the same time, though, some regulatory programs may yield marginal benefits
that increase at a faster rate than they do in, say, IOLTA programs. For example, the
value of government provision of some goods may benefit from network effects, in
which "the utility that a user derives from consumption of a good increases with
the number of other agents consuming the good." See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro,
Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 Am Econ Rev 424, 424
(1985) (defining network effects).
" This discussion pertains to mandatory IOLTA programs only. If lawyers can opt
out, as many states now allow, see text accompanying note 9 above, then clients
could indirectly opt-out by choosing a non-participating lawyer. Voluntary and opt-
out programs involve giving, not taking; with respect to them, just compensation is
irrelevant.
56 Phillips, 118 S Ct at 1938 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
s Id at 1934 (deferring taking and just compensation issues).
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away from anyone else). 8 We would think about distributing D in
ways that might better serve the underlying purposes of the Takings
Clause. There could be forms of general distribution, for example,
that gave clients a voice in determining how interest from their
principal is used.
In short, conventional takings analysis identifies A (gross interest)
and B (net interest) as the amounts that matter. Concerns with
deterrence and distribution, on the other hand, shift attention to C
and D, thereby identifying the opt-out and client-voice alternatives
discussed above.
B. Deterrence and Distribution in Phillips
Phillips is far from transparent to us. The path taken by all the
justices in the case resulted in, among other things, a conventional
factual record that is inadequate for our unconventional purposes.
On the deterrence side, we need to know if IOLTA programs are
likely to be so inefficient or oppressive that requiring the government
to pay damages will act as a salutary check. To evaluate distribution
questions we need more nuanced information regarding the plain-
tiffs' fairness claims and options for redressing them. We offer some
initial speculations in the absence of a more developed record.
There is little doubt that pooling programs in general can give
rise to concerns about inefficiency and the need for general deter-
rence, but we think the particular method of pooling used in IOLTA
programs ends up passing muster. The programs do generate value,
and at no actual financial expense to anyone but banks (which were
getting a bit of a windfall in the first place). There is little monetary
burden, per capita and total, and thus little reason to worry about
general deterrence. As for specific deterrence, it is hard to see that
IOLTA programs exploit any politically vulnerable groups (such as
clients depositing funds). The programs might not be the most effi-
cient way to provide low-income legal services, but they do not seem
terribly wasteful either.
Fairness is another matter. IOLTA programs compromise the
expressive and liberty interests of depositing clients, but conven-
tional takings analysis is not very responsive to these concerns. 9
5" Justice Souter noted that courts would "measure any required compensation by
the claimant's loss, not by the government's (or the public's) gain." Id at 1936 (Souter,
J, dissenting). And, by analogy from land valuation cases, Justice Breyer noted that
"the government must pay the current value of condemned land, not the added value
that a highway it builds on the property itself creates." Id at 1939 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
s9 See note 11 above (discussing the plaintiff's First Amendment concerns).
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The majority in Phillips, for example, focused on monetary injuries
that were trivial at best, yet ignored the denial of voice that moti-
vated the case in the first place. As we mentioned in our earlier
discussion of conceptual severance, the majority separated principal
from interest, then considered the interest as a tangible thing that
might have been taken; putting the principal to the service of IOLTA
programs, on the other hand, was "at most" a regulation of the
"use of property," and thus almost surely constitutional.60 Ironically,
though, taking their interest actually hurts clients not at all, whereas
conscripting their principal offends them a lot.
Our view, in sum, is this. If justice requires it, courts should be
allowed to make general distributions that give clients a voice in
the use of IOLTA funds, or to permit clients or their lawyers to opt
out of the programs altogether.6' All in all, however, we do not see
IOLTA programs as utterly inferior to alternative means of funding
low-income legal services, such as a tax on clients or lawyers, so
we are inclined to think that such moves are unnecessary. Perhaps
fairness concerns would receive a more sympathetic hearing in a
First Amendment tribunal than they do in our Takings Clause court.
CONCLUSION
The Phillips case is more interesting for what it provokes than for
what it provides. The debates among the justices about the meaning
of private property, argued in terms of contextual and conceptual
severance, are unlikely to prove fruitful. Formalistic parsing of the
Takings Clause, whether word-by-word or as an integrated whole,
tells us little about how to harmonize the competing values at stake
in modem regulatory programs. A better approach is to think in
terms of the underlying purposes of just compensation, and to see
that efficiency and justice are best served by uncoupling matters and
methods of deterrence from matters and methods of distribution.
'6 Phillips, 118 S Ct at 1930. See text accompanying notes 36-37 above.
61 Though the tax treatment of client-voice and opt-out options would differ,
takings analysis should not be tied to such concerns. With client-voice, the Internal
Revenue Service would probably impute IOLTA interest to clients as income; with
opt-out, there would be no imputed income. Phillips, 118 S Ct at 1933 (citing the
relevant IRS interpretations).
